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World Bank survey missions and the politics of decolonization in British East 
Africa, 1957-1963
*
 
 
In the same years in which they gained independence, the East African territories of 
Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya also received three economic survey reports from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or World Bank).
1
 This 
coincidence was not lost on contemporary observers. Alan Peacock noted for instance 
that “[i]n a remarkably short space of time the wind of change in Africa has brought 
Tanganyika all the major status symbols of an independent country set on rapid economic 
development, including a visit from an International Bank Mission.”2 A reviewer of the 
Kenya report identified a rationale behind this link: “[w]hen a business is handed over to 
new owners it is customary to take stock of its assets and liabilities. Similarly, when 
African countries are finally overtaken by democracy the elected government is liable to 
be presented with a World Bank Report on the economic development of their country.”3  
 
This connection would also not have surprised those who, mainly in the 1970s, attributed 
many of Africa‟s economic problems to its continued economic dependence, sustained 
culturally and politically by Western neo-colonialism.
4
 However, most of the recent 
literature on the decolonization of the British Empire has since served to dispel the notion 
of “imperialism after empire,” arguing instead that Britain lacked both the capacity and 
                                                 
*
 This paper is a refined version of an MA dissertation at the University of Leicester. My sincere thanks go 
to Bernard Attard, Ian Phimister and Gerold Krozewski for their constructive comments on earlier drafts. 
All errors remain mine.  
1
 IBRD, The Economic Development of Tanganyika (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961); IBRD, The 
Economic Development of Uganda (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962); IBRD, The Economic 
Development of Kenya (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963). Referred to further as Tanganyika Report, 
Uganda Report and Kenya Report. 
2
 Alan T. Peacock, The Economic Journal 72, 287 (1962), 724. 
3
 J. S. Skinner, The Journal of Modern African Studies 1, 4 (1963), 551. 
4
 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, (London, 1972); Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in 
Kenya: the Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 1964-1971 (London: Heinemann, 1975);  Samir Amin, 
Imperialism and Unequal Development (New York, 1977). 
 2 
the determination to continue to shape its colonies‟ post-colonial future.5 Despite 
occasional claims to the contrary, Britain‟s retreat from empire did not proceed according 
to a preconceived plan. The conditions and timing of transfers of power were often 
dictated by circumstances over which Britain had only the most rudimentary control. 
British ambitions now appear to have been mostly limited to getting out with honor and 
avoiding either political collapse or the emergence of openly hostile successor regimes. 
The neo-colonialist argument has been further undermined by detailed research into the 
actions and attitudes of big business during decolonization, which has exonerated one of 
its prime suspects.
6
 The combined result of these research trends has been to downplay 
the active production of continuities linking Africa‟s colonial past to its post-colonial 
present.
7
 This study of the politics behind the World Bank‟s East African survey missions 
aims to counterbalance this trend by shedding light on some of the ways in which 
colonial practices and orthodoxies were actively reproduced despite Britain‟s limited 
“neo-colonial” ambitions.  
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The argument is organized in two parts: a first part focuses on the decision-making 
process leading to the invitation of IBRD survey missions into East Africa. The recasting 
of Britain‟s international economic and political relationships in the late 1950s both 
helped to create the conditions behind the requests and constituted the framework from 
which the missions‟ potential dangers and benefits were evaluated. A second part 
analyses the interaction between the IBRD experts and the British colonial administration 
and the ways in which the missions‟ reports were influenced by British concerns such as 
the need to limit financial claims on Britain and the undesirability of recommendations in 
the currency field. While the invitation of IBRD missions into East Africa did not form 
part of any British master plan for the decolonization of East Africa, pressures in this 
direction were seized upon by the Colonial Office in an attempt to reconcile the two 
mutually exclusive aims of countering mounting pressure for increased development 
expenditure, with the anticipated consequences for British resources, and maintaining 
good relations with nationalist elites. The reports emerging from this interaction endorsed 
and reinforced colonial economic policies, while East Africa‟s independence in financial 
matters was postponed.  
 
I 
 
The initiative to invite World Bank general survey missions originated with the East 
African local administrations, not the metropolitan Colonial Office. The details of a 
proposal by Kenya‟s finance minister Ernest Vasey in 1954 for a mission covering East 
Africa as a whole are not recorded,
8
 but when the Colonial Office was first officially 
approached by Tanganyika in 1957, Tilney, Vasey‟s Tanganyikan counterpart, indicated 
that the possibility “had been discussed from time to time in the past.”9  
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Tanganyika‟s application gave little by way of motivation, and aroused little enthusiasm 
at the Colonial Office. Tilney merely indicated that a report “by so authoritative and 
impartial a body on the possibilities and limitations of our economy would carry great 
weight both internally and abroad,” and pointed to the likelihood of Tanganyika wishing 
to seek a loan from the Bank in the near future, in which case the survey could serve as a 
useful basis for negotiations.
10
 The case did not strike the Colonial Office as particularly 
strong.
11
 Apart from a number of minor inconveniences attached to an invitation to the 
IBRD,
12
 there existed a broad consensus within the Colonial Office that a World Bank 
mission was unlikely to either shed new light on Tanganyika‟s agricultural and industrial 
potential or recommend any significant improvements to its economic and development 
policies. “We have a good idea of what Tanganyika‟s problems are,” Mrs. Maccoll of the 
Economic General Department noted, “we do not need the IBRD to tell us this.”13 
Officials doubted the extent to which local administrations generally followed World 
Bank recommendations and, in any case, the East African Royal Commission had just 
presented its recommendations for East African economic development.
14
 Finally, 
Tanganyika‟s budgetary situation severely limited the scope for stepping up the 
development effort: “Financially speaking,” it was noted within the Finance Department, 
“Tanganyika has to keep things on a tight rein and the governing factor […] is quite 
simply shortage of money.”15 
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Metropolitan reservations were imbedded in a set of wider considerations. Tanganyika‟s 
financial difficulties arose from a combination of increased government expenditure, a 
deterioration in world commodity prices and Great Britain‟s reconsideration of its 
financial commitments to its dependent empire.
16
 Post-war reformist colonialism had 
linked economic and social change to gradual political advancement and increased 
participation of a “modernized” African elite in its own administration. According to the 
Colonial Office‟s formula economic transformation and nation-building, which involved 
a steady expansion of government functions and expenditure, went hand in hand.
17
 In 
Tanganyika, this strengthening of the centre involved grooming TANU and Julius 
Nyerere, which was believed to offer the benefit of familiarizing them with the virtues of 
conservative financial management
18
. “It has done more than anything that happened in 
the last few years to give a new sense of purpose to the Administration,” Governor 
Edward Twining explained, “the idea of working with rather than against Nyerere, and 
the idea of taming him by letting him see at first hand the problems with which 
government has to deal.”19 So long as it had been possible to ride the wave of the 
commodities boom and Britain depended on the dollar-earning power of its dependent 
Empire, the costs this strategy involved appeared acceptable, while also being largely 
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covered by increased current or projected revenue.
20
 By the middle of the 1950s, 
however, reformist colonialism was seen as prohibitively expensive as Britain‟s ability to 
finance it deteriorated and its economic benefits largely disappeared.
21
  
 
Britain‟s external economic relations were largely shaped by the needs and views of its 
financial sector
22
. During the 1950s, the “gentlemanly order” which dominated the Bank 
of England and the Treasury was preoccupied primarily with the restoration of the 
weakened pound to its former role as an international trade currency and the re-
establishment of London as a global financial and service centre.
23
 At first, this concern 
was translated into the pooling of dollar earnings in a centrally directed sterling area, 
characterized primarily by the accumulation of colonial trade surpluses as sterling 
balances in London.
24
 By the mid-1950s the policy focus had shifted to the improvement 
of Britain‟s own balance of payments through internal economic adjustment, but this too 
had its repercussions for the colonies: the continued fragility of Britain‟s currency 
reserves and balance of payments position led to an unwillingness to provide capital for 
colonial development, and a readvertizement of the merits of financial self-sufficiency.
25
 
As the steady expansion of government services and the raising of colonial living 
standards were impossible to combine with a return to financial austerity, the colonial 
administrations‟ relationship with African elites became increasingly strained. It was this 
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fundamental difficulty which led the Tanganyika administration to look to the IBRD for 
possible salvation. 
 
The management of the accumulated sterling balances caused considerable metropolitan 
concern. The contribution the balances made to Britain‟s currency reserves remained 
considerable throughout the 1950s, and any sudden changes in their levels were expected 
to undermine confidence in sterling.
26
 What was required was a gradual and managed 
reduction in function of improvements in Britain‟s reserve position. This required, 
amongst other things, resisting claims by the colonies for immediate access to their 
balances as a source of development finance. Besides further increasing the financial 
pressure on colonial administrations, this requirement also directly affected London‟s 
attitude to the invitation of IBRD general survey missions. At the root of this lay the 
recommendation made by a World Bank mission to Nigeria that it should create a central 
bank to facilitate the financing of its economic development.
27
 As currency liberalization 
was expected to trigger demands in the colonies to draw on their sterling balances, this 
suggestion had been most unwelcome to the Bank of England, leading the Bank and in its 
wake the Treasury to express severe reservations regarding the desirability of any survey 
missions being undertaken within the British colonies.
28
 While IBRD advice and finance 
should still be sought for specific projects, care needed to be taken that any enquiries 
which could touch upon colonial currency arrangements (which could “not be appraised 
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only as a local and technical problem”) were strictly avoided.29 Even though the Colonial 
Office held general survey missions in higher esteem than the Bank of England did, it felt 
obliged to reassure the Bank and the Treasury that it was not their policy to encourage 
requests for World Bank missions.
30
  
 
A final but crucial element which determined London‟s reception of Tanganyika‟s 
request lay in the sphere of international relations. Britain‟s attitude to its colonial 
possessions in the late 1950s was shaped to a large extent by its undiminished 
commitment to Great Power status. Britain‟s continued prominence in international 
affairs depended on its relationship with the United States on the one hand, and the 
growing Commonwealth on the other.
31
 In order to cultivate these relationships, Britain 
was increasingly forced to legitimize its enduring colonial presence by advertising its 
commitment to rapid economic and political progress. Avoiding criticism, in particular at 
the United Nations, progressively became a prime determinant of Britain‟s approach to 
its colonies, as the Foreign Office in particular believed that Britain had much to gain by 
way of prestige and international standing by acting, or appearing to act, as a liberal and 
decolonizing power.
32
 This international dimension was particularly prominent in the 
case of Tanganyika, whose policies, as a Trusteeship territory, were subject to the 
scrutiny of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.
33
 Tanganyika‟s Trustee status gave 
rise to fears that an IBRD mission would draw the Trusteeship Council‟s attention to 
Tanganyika‟s capital shortage, thus putting international pressure on the Treasury to 
increase its development aid.
34
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The risk involved in letting the IBRD cast its eye over Tanganyika‟s financial difficulties 
ultimately depended on the likelihood of it suggesting that Britain should ease the 
territory‟s problems by contributing extra funds under the form of loans, grants, access to 
the sterling balances or the liberalization of the East African currency arrangements.
35
 
Given London‟s determination to resist such pressures, such recommendations would 
subject her to international criticism, and would also upset local political relationships by 
drawing African attention to the financial conservatism of the colonial power. However, 
some within the Colonial Office argued that a mission could also have the opposite 
effect. If abstraction could be made of political considerations and British financial 
assistance to the territory, Tanganyika‟s financial problem simply became one of 
increases in expenditure which were not covered by matching increases in local revenue. 
Under current circumstances, they argued, expenditure on social services in particular 
needed to be sacrificed in favor of schemes with a direct positive impact on future 
revenues: with the return of financial self-sufficiency and the fall in commodity prices, 
Tanganyika needed to cut its coat according to its cloth.
36
 Obtaining a downward revision 
of social service expenditure involved considerable political difficulties, including the 
possible undermining of the position of TANU “moderates”. An IBRD endorsement of 
Britain‟s conservative views on Tanganyika‟s financial position and development 
potential, it was felt, would provide the local administration and Nyerere with the tools 
needed to ward off unjustified criticisms: “there is much point in the argument that IBRD 
Surveys bring home to local peoples and governments the need for economic policies 
which would be less acceptable if suggested by less independent sources.”37 In past 
applications, it turned out, such considerations had also determined which invitations 
were forwarded to the IBRD.
38
 As no news of any strong local opposition to the 
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administration‟s economic policies had reached the Colonial Office at the time of 
Tilney‟s request, however, the risks still seemed to outweigh such uncertain benefits.39  
 
Tilney‟s second approach to the Colonial Office made more of the political pressures 
which underlay his request. This time, the stress was not so much on the desirability of 
further economic reform, but on the need to counter criticism “amongst politicians of all 
parties” that only “official conservatism and lack of initiative” stood in the way of faster 
economic progress.
40
 Moreover, Tilney confirmed the news that the UN Visiting Mission, 
which had just visited the territory, held a similar view and would probably itself 
recommend an invitation to the IBRD in its report to the Trusteeship Council.
41
 A rapid 
endorsement of Tanganyika‟s request would now have the double benefit of allowing 
Britain to take credit for forestalling this recommendation at the UN, and of enabling the 
local administration to reassure African politicians that it was taking the issue of 
economic development seriously.
42
 The international dimension in particular now 
ensured that matters moved quickly. By the end of November the Colonial Office had 
been won over, Secretary of State Alan Lennox-Boyd had expressed his support and 
exploratory negotiations with the World Bank were opened.  
 
The weakness originally perceived by the Colonial Office, the narrow scope for change 
under existing budgetary conditions, was turned into a strength in the context of local and 
international criticism of Britain‟s economic conservatism.43 While support for the 
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application was mainly inspired by short-term political expediency, the greater prize to be 
won was IBRD recommendations on the need to reduce social service expenditure and 
balance the territorial budget in the relatively short term. This, in any case, was the 
substance of the case as presented to the Treasury.
44
 For such a result to be obtained, 
however, the mission needed to stay clear of more sensitive issues and be prevented from 
recommending an increase in British financial assistance. The instructions to David 
Pitblado, the Treasury Delegate at the Embassy in Washington, were clear on this point: 
when approaching the World Bank he needed to “make the points […] that we hope that 
the Mission will not get unduly involved in discussing currency matters, and that it would 
not be fruitful to suggest an increase in subventions or any disproportionate capital 
assistance from the United Kingdom.”45  
 
Tanganyika‟s successful application for a World Bank mission had the unintended, 
though not unexpected, consequence of encouraging similar requests from Uganda and, 
later, Kenya.
46
 The question whether the Tanganyika survey should be extended to cover 
East Africa as a whole had been posed from the very start. East Africa was in many ways 
organized as a single economic unit, with a common market, a single currency, and the 
centralization of certain key services in the East African High Commission. It was also, 
as far as Britain was concerned, destined for political federation. Even though, given 
these connections, it was unavoidable that the Tanganyika mission would consider the 
wider East African context, the suggestion that a survey should be carried out on an East 
African basis, as favored by Kenya, was successfully resisted by the Uganda and 
Tanganyika administrations on political grounds.
47
 Discussions with the IBRD 
exploratory mission, which visited all three territories in May 1958, did however spark 
the Ugandan administration‟s interest in a separate survey. Melmoth, the territory‟s 
finance minister, had identified certain fields upon which he invited the Bank‟s advice.48 
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As the IBRD team did not consider these a sufficient basis for a full second survey 
mission, they advised him to study the progress of the Tanganyika mission and give 
further consideration as to the kind of survey he required.
49
 On 18 June 1959, shortly 
after the World Bank team arrived in Tanganyika, Melmoth wrote to the Colonial Office 
requesting a separate survey to be undertaken in Uganda.
50
  
 
The support lent to Tanganyika‟s earlier request did not lead to an automatic acceptance 
of Uganda‟s application. Although Uganda‟s financial difficulties were no less pressing, 
its problems appeared more narrowly economic in origin. Uganda‟s export economy and 
tax revenue relied heavily on two single commodities, cotton and coffee, the prices of 
which had plummeted since the mid-1950s.
51
 As production expanded more slowly than 
prices fell, revenues had dropped and budget deficits appeared –deficits which the British 
Treasury was reluctant to cover. Unsurprisingly, the terms of reference proposed by 
Melmoth focused on ways in which the administration could restore its tax base by 
stimulating increased production and diversification.
52
 Although these issues were set 
against the background of the need to strengthen the central administration and raise 
African living standards as the territory approached responsible self-government, local or 
international political pressures of the kind which had assured the approval of 
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Tanganyika‟s request were largely missing.53 In the absence of such direct political 
pressures, and possibly as a result of Melmoth‟s unwelcome expansionist tendencies as 
well, the Colonial Office preferred to rely on expertise available within the Empire 
instead of a World Bank mission.
54
 Again Colonial Office reluctance was only overcome 
when this suggestion was resisted on the basis of the political objectives behind Uganda‟s 
request.
55
  
 
As had been the case with Tanganyika, in endorsing Uganda‟s request the Colonial 
Office shifted the focus towards the assistance an IBRD mission could render the 
administration in its difficult task of balancing the territorial budget, thus helping to avoid 
claims on the Treasury to finance Uganda‟s deficits.56 In Uganda‟s case, however, this 
reformulation of objectives constituted a more radical departure from the outcome 
originally intended by the administration: alterations to the proposed terms of reference 
subtly shifted the focus from developmental goals towards a reconsideration of 
government expenditure in a wide range of fields. The economic roots of Uganda‟s 
budgetary problems, it was implied, should not lead it to expect that its expenditure on 
social services was immune from downward revision. 
 
The Kenya mission occupied a special position in the IBRD surveys to East Africa. In 
stark contrast to the lukewarm response to Tanganyika‟s and Uganda‟s requests, the 
Colonial Office now played an active role in encouraging and speeding up the 
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application.
57
 While it was a member of the Kenya Assembly, Mrs. E. D. Hughes, who 
first suggested an application to the IBRD in London, the Secretary of State Iain 
MacLeod seized the initiative by writing directly to the Governor expressing his strong 
support for the idea.
58
 After adoption of the proposal by the Kenya council of ministers, 
the Colonial Office was officially approached by Kenneth Mackenzie on 13 December 
1960.
59
 Mackenzie‟s application did not elaborate on the desired outcomes of a World 
Bank report, but stated merely that an expert review of Kenya‟s financial and economic 
policies would have “numerous benefits.”60 Despite the poorly presented case, the 
Colonial Office did not request additional information, but itself prepared a detailed 
statement of Kenya‟s requirements to be forwarded immediately to the Treasury and the 
IBRD.
61
 After the World Bank had been approached, the Colonial Office continued to 
exert pressure to ensure that the mission was mounted “with the least possible delay.”62 
 
This sense of urgency reflected the immediate political purpose the mission was meant to 
serve in the context of Kenya‟s more turbulent road towards independence.63 Since the 
Lancaster House Conference of January 1960, Kenya‟s economy had been in a state of 
turmoil. Although the move towards African majority rule was relatively cautious and 
qualified, the months following the conference witnessed an embarrassingly large 
outflow of capital as European settlers and expatriate businesses re-evaluated their 
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economic prospects under African leadership.
64
 Fears regarding the future treatment of 
migrant communities and the respect the new Government would show for their property 
rights were heightened by KADU‟s and KANU‟s campaigns for the 1961 elections.65 In 
the case it presented to the Treasury, the Colonial Office drew particular attention to the 
“steadying influence” the presence of a World Bank mission could have, hopefully 
leading the new Government “to behave sensibly and responsibly.”66 It was this 
educational aspect which led the Colonial Office to insist that at least the exploratory 
mission should arrive in Kenya before the new Government took office.
67
 By 
highlighting the vital contribution the migrant communities were making to the Kenyan 
economy, the IBRD mission would assist Britain in promoting multi-racialism; to the 
extent that this influence would be seen to bear fruit, the mission‟s presence would also 
contribute to the restoration of business confidence.
68
 
 
The specificity of its political situation aside, very similar conditions to those of 
Tanganyika and Uganda underlay Kenya‟s application to the World Bank. At the heart of 
the problem were large and increasing budget deficits which Britain no longer wished to 
support. Lack of confidence and capital flight dramatically exacerbated the revenue 
repercussions of falling commodity prices and a relatively high level of government 
expenditure which, in Kenya‟s case, reflected the service needs of a white settler 
community as well as the attempt to build up a class of “moderate” Africans on whose 
collaboration the territory‟s multiracial future depended.69 Kenya had relied heavily on 
British financial assistance for the implementation of agricultural reform under the 
Swynnerton plan. Weaning the territory from this aid was made particularly difficult by 
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falling revenues and political instability, so that by December 1961 the concern was 
expressed that Britain might need to subsidize Kenya to an extent of £30 million per 
annum
70
. Apart from immediate political aims, the main object of inviting the IBRD was 
to obtain recommendations which would help prepare Kenya for “financial 
independence.” Particular attention needed to be paid to the balancing of the territorial 
budget. As the expenditure cuts Britain hoped for were politically sensitive, it was 
preferable for these recommendations to be made by an external body.  
 
From a British perspective, all three IBRD missions were to serve political rather than 
economic goals. In no case was the Colonial Office motivated by a genuine desire for 
independent advice on East African development strategies. Instead it hoped that the 
World Bank missions would assist in garnering political support for the unpopular 
austerity measures and cuts in government spending which Britain considered necessary 
given the depressed state of commodity prices and its desire to reduce financial 
commitments to the region. 
 
II.  
 
If the Colonial Office expected the IBRD missions to yield political benefits, it did not 
assume that their reports would be completely or automatically congenial to Britain, nor 
did it feel in a position to openly pressure the missions to fall in line with its own 
perspective. Nonetheless, the Colonial Office, the Bank of England and the Treasury each 
worked in close contact with the missions to secure the best reports possible. The British 
colonial authorities and the World Bank teams generally worked in a spirit of co-
operation, but the influence Britain exerted also formed part of a conscious strategy to 
secure economically conservative reports.
71
 This they were able to do by altering or 
drawing up the missions‟ terms of reference, through talks held in London with the 
preparatory and survey missions both before and after their visits to East Africa, by 
commenting upon the draft reports and discussing unwelcome passages with the authors, 
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and through contacts in Washington, both at the British Embassy and within the World 
Bank itself.
72
  
 
The influence Britain exerted on the IBRD missions was significant but also subject to 
strict limitations. The World Bank‟s legitimacy and effectiveness depended on the 
recognition of its independence and impartiality.
73
 Though subject to political pressure 
from its major members through their Executive Directors, the IBRD also possessed a 
distinct institutional culture and ideology.
74
 This ideology entailed a sincere commitment 
to economic development, but was also shaped by the Bank‟s own dependence on bond 
markets. This dependence led to a hard-nosed approach to development finance, a 
preoccupation with sovereign creditworthiness, and a marked preference for projects 
which were marketable to private investors over improvements in health, education and 
social services which coincided happily with Britain‟s own objectives. While the survey 
missions were not part of the IBRD hierarchy and laid no claim on the Bank‟s resources, 
the fact that the majority of the missions‟ leading members were sourced from the 
IBRD‟s own staff ensured that their reports reflected this institutional culture.75  
 
While any direct interference which compromised the mission‟s integrity would be firmly 
resisted, its political authority over East Africa may still have presented Britain with 
some leverage over the IBRD missions, as the implementation of the missions‟ 
recommendations depended at least partially on their acceptability to the colonial 
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administration.
76
 However, this power was bounded as colonial rule was now widely 
recognized as being negotiated and extremely temporary.
77
 A more effective and 
enduring source of strength was Britain‟s position as East Africa‟s main source of outside 
capital, and its ability to refuse financial support for projects which did not meet its 
approval. By and large, however, Britain had to rely on persuasion rather than overt 
pressure to get its views considered: the accommodation of London‟s concerns depended 
on their recognition as “knowledge” or “expertise” rather than the protection of a specific 
interest.
78
 Such recognition was facilitated by a broad communality of views on the role 
of the state, market relations, foreign capital, property rights and government finance 
grounded in development economics and a shared concern for creditworthiness and good 
debtor policies. The prominent role the IBRD was starting to play in the dissemination of 
ideas on economic development suggests that the dialogue its staff engaged in with 
Africa‟s colonial rulers warrants further study. Even so, London was competing for the 
missions‟ attention with African politicians, local administrators, experts and interest 
groups, some of whom enjoyed privileged access to the missions during their work in 
East Africa.  
 
Although most aspects of the missions‟ progress and findings were studied and 
commented upon within the Colonial Office, attempts at influencing the mission‟s report 
were concentrated in a limited number of fields. Notably absent from discussions with the 
IBRD missions were issues directly related to economic development, including 
agricultural and industrial production, infrastructure, social services and education. This 
silence had much to do with the fact that, overall, the missions‟ thinking closely followed 
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colonial doctrine, even if not always colonial practice.
79
 However, on occasions where 
Colonial Office experts did have reservations about specific recommendations, these 
were also not communicated to the missions.
80
 From the Colonial Office‟s perspective 
the World Bank‟s proposals were interesting at best, but also largely inconsequential: the 
Bank, it will be remembered, was not credited with superior development expertise, and 
the implementation of many of its recommendations appeared doubtful.
81
 Interference 
which could cause friction was therefore gladly avoided - Britain‟s only real concern was 
to assure that the missions would preach financial conservatism. The pressure Britain 
exerted thereto focused on three distinct but interconnected issues: the need to balance 
territorial budgets, limiting claims on Britain for development funds, and the protection 
of East Africa‟s currency arrangements. Underlying these three issues were Britain‟s own 
balance of payments problems and the protection of sterling. 
 
From a Treasury perspective, financing post-war colonial development had been part of a 
strategy to strengthen sterling by boosting the sterling area‟s commodity exports.82 By the 
mid-1950s, however, falling commodity prices and increasing imports had rendered a 
positive colonial contribution to sterling increasingly unlikely, leading to a reappraisal of 
Britain‟s financial relations with the dependencies.83 In 1955, Henry Hopkinson had told 
the House of Commons that, as a correlative to the devolution of political power, colonies 
“should bear an increasing part of the cost of their own development.”84 The same line 
was followed in a March 1957 White Paper which foresaw an end to direct financial 
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assistance to the colonies as soon as they reached independence.
85
 As political 
independence would also entail “financial independence” the colonies needed to be 
weaned from British financial aid in anticipation: pressure on them mounted to balance 
territorial budgets, build up their own credit and raise their own development capital. 
Britain‟s financial conservatism was most pronounced during the intense budgetary 
pressure and balance of payment difficulties of the mid-1950s, but although 
improvements in economic outlook allowed Britain to be more liberal as time progressed, 
the availability of development finance remained tied to the precarious balance of 
payments situation.
86
 Eligibility for financial assistance also continued to be linked to the 
recipient‟s creditworthiness: development finance mostly took the form of loans, and 
deserving recipients were those with the proven ability and appropriate policies to service 
the debts incurred.  
 
The principle that colonies should become financially independent on recurrent account 
appeared natural to the IBRD missions and, in line with the Colonial Office‟s wishes, 
much of their attention was directed at working out how this could be achieved. Rather 
than lingering over colonial legacies, the inherited economic structure and administrative 
apparatus the reports portrayed African efforts and sound management as the main 
determinants of future success or failure, thus further supporting Britain‟s dissociation 
from imperial responsibilities.
87
 Development was constructed as a local or national 
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rather than an imperial issue, and the means to promote it were to be looked for in East 
Africa rather than London.
88
 Balancing the territorial budgets without recourse to British 
recurrent assistance was, however, fraught with difficulties: cutting expenditure entailed 
political difficulties, while the scope for increasing revenue in the short term was limited 
by low commodity prices. It was Tanganyika‟s inability to balance its budget which had 
inspired its approach to the Colonial Office, a recurrent budget deficit of £5 million had 
been predicted for Uganda, and in Kenya the picture looked even gloomier.
89
 The 
Colonial Office recognized that such deficits could not be made to disappear overnight: 
in April 1959 Lennox Boyd told the Colonial Policy Committee that, for the time being, 
it was impossible to completely ease East Africa away from development funds, 
otherwise “the whole aim of trying to secure a planned constitutional development 
[would] be gravely jeopardized.”90 Even so, IBRD recommendations on the optimal size 
or duration of this assistance were not called for: levels of British aid, the missions were 
made to understand, should simply be accepted as given.  
 
In terms of general policy, there were no major differences in opinion between the 
Colonial Office and the World Bank missions. From the first meetings with the 
Tanganyika mission in London through to the published Kenya report, the missions 
consistently called for restraint in expenditure on non-essential services.
91
 On the revenue 
side, some divergent advice was given on taxation, but the consensus remained that 
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increased government revenue was to come mainly from an intensification of revenue 
yielding economic activity: a major function of all three development programs was thus 
to balance future territorial budgets. While there was obviously nothing in this with 
which the Colonial Office wished to quarrel, it did feel that the Missions needed 
occasional prompting to translate these guidelines into concrete recommendations.  
 
The initial impression the Colonial Office gained from the Tanganyika mission was that 
its proposals were too soft and general as well as expensive.
92
 When Gorell Barnes 
informed the IBRD in Washington of his doubts whether the mission was really tackling 
the territory‟s tougher financial dilemmas, he was reassured that this omission would be 
rectified.
93
 The subsequent draft report indeed provided for a smaller increase in 
expenditure than the projected rise in revenue, and stressed that the expansion of 
government services needed to take second place to intensifying production.
94
 Despite 
remaining disappointment with the report‟s truisms, no further interventions followed as, 
by this time, Tanganyika‟s financial outlook had improved due to the relative stability of 
its terms of trade and the United Kingdom‟s decision to take over financial responsibility 
for the East African Land Forces Organisation.
95
  
 
As the Uganda mission was more outspoken in its recommendations on government 
expenditure, its recommendations were generally better received.
96
 The tentative 
conclusions held that social welfare expenditure was at its upper limits. In order to allow 
for an increase in agricultural development all other expenditure needed to be strictly 
limited.
97
 This view was affirmed in the draft report, which suggested that despite 
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mounting pressure the trend to increase public expenditure required dampening.
98
 The 
mission‟s proposals brought the recurrent budget back into balance, and even allowed for 
a contribution from recurrent account to the development budget.
99
 The Colonial Office 
did not believe such a contribution would prove possible: not only did the value of 
Uganda‟s exports continue to decline, British recurrent assistance would also fall 
considerably short of the mission‟s expectations.100 Nonetheless, given the positive 
impression the mission‟s proposals left in London, no real alterations were requested. The 
mission was merely told to transfer £5.5 million finance for the development program to 
the portion still to be financed, with the understanding that additional British assistance 
could be discussed after Uganda had considered the mission‟s proposals.101 
 
Of the three East African territories, Kenya was most reliant on external capital. 
Thompson, the IBRD mission‟s chief economist, estimated that one-eighth of Kenya‟s 
recurrent expenditure was sustained by British aid, and expenditure was still rising 
despite stagnant revenues. In a “Memorandum on Taxation” Thompson argued for a 
thorough reappraisal of government expenditure “with the aim of eliminating 
nonessential expenditures and those not supporting the expansion of production.”102 In 
this he echoed the Colonial Office‟s view that Kenya should move towards a level of 
services similar to those of Tanganyika and Uganda.
103
 Thompson‟s suggestion that wage 
levels could be reduced as Africanization proceeded was particularly welcome as it was 
not one which the Colonial Office itself could make. However, the mission‟s suggestion 
that, parallel to such budgetary measures, British assistance would also need to increase 
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“if [Kenya] was to have a reasonable independent government” was much less 
welcome.
104
 Despite repeated prompting, the Colonial Office refused to discuss the 
continuation of grants-in-aid, maintaining instead that Kenya‟s priority should be the 
achievement of financial independence through reduced government spending.
105
 Upon 
receipt of the mission‟s draft report in August 1962, officials expressed doubts regarding 
the projected contribution of £1.5 million towards the development program from the 
recurrent budget, and were disappointed that the mission‟s call for economies was 
insufficiently matched by practical proposals on how these could be achieved.
106
 By 
pointing to additional factors which would adversely affect Kenya‟s budget, the Colonial 
Office continued to put pressure on the mission to economize.  
 
The three missions‟ fiscal recommendations differed somewhat depending on the severity 
of the territories‟ financial crises and the scope for quick returns from expanded 
production. The Tanganyika mission could afford to argue against increased taxation, 
though it also maintained that tax concessions for pioneer industries should not be 
contemplated.
107
  In the cases of Uganda and Kenya, however, the World Bank missions 
did recommend fiscal measures to alleviate the more immediate budgetary difficulties. In 
addition to increased excise and customs duties, the Uganda mission argued for an 
African contribution to the income tax as well as an increase in company taxes, though in 
this case tax holidays for pioneer industries were considered advisable.
108
 Proposals for 
Kenya followed a similar line, except on the issue of tax holidays, where the mission 
shared the Tanganyika report‟s reservations.109 Although the Colonial Office disliked 
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rising company taxes and was also somewhat irritated by the divergent advice offered, 
only modest fiscal reforms were proposed by any of the missions.
110
 Mostly, they agreed, 
increased revenues needed to come from increased production.  
 
The IBRD missions‟ call for a serious concentration of funds and manpower on increased 
taxable production had the predominant objective of assisting future government budgets 
and, eventually, obtaining a surplus from which further development could be financed. 
With this in mind, the development programs were designed to have a maximum effect 
on future recurrent account, while recurrent expenditure was restricted to allow for a 
recurrent contribution towards the development program: “our strategy is […] doing all 
that can be done […] to raise output. On success in the raising of the national income all 
else depends.”111 East African governments were thus asked to tighten their belts just 
when they achieved political independence. These austerity policies were portrayed as 
essential prerequisites for the future fulfillment of social aspirations; in London, they 
were mostly welcomed for their effect of reducing calls on the Treasury.
112
 To ensure this 
effect would indeed be achieved, the Colonial Office repeatedly encouraged the missions 
to prioritize productive over social investment.
113
 Britain was only prepared to contribute 
financially to development programs which facilitated the future self-financing of 
economic growth through increased production and government revenues. This much 
was implied in the point Gorell Barnes raised in Washington, that the Tanganyika 
mission “might not be tackling the essential question whether Tanganyika was capable of 
absorbing a substantial injection of capital over a relatively short period of years and then 
emerging at a higher level which she would thereafter be able to sustain herself, or 
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whether the choice was between economic independence at a very low level on the one 
hand or indefinite economic dependence at a higher level on the other.”114 
 
Just as Britain rejected financial responsibility for its dependencies on recurrent account, 
it considerably increased its overseas development budget.
115
 The provision of 
development aid was perceived as important both to the United Kingdom‟s international 
reputation and to the preservation of informal influence after the end of colonial rule.
116
 
British development finance was also essential in keeping former colonies tied to sterling 
– still an important consideration, as sudden withdrawals from the sterling balances 
would undermine confidence in the currency. However, the sums available were still 
determined by Britain‟s balance of payments position and remained modest in 
comparison to the goals to be achieved.
117
 
 
The limited resources at Britain‟s disposal inspired efforts by the Colonial Office to limit 
the size of the IBRD missions‟ development programs. Externally financed development 
projects aimed at boosting production were welcomed, but also needed to be in line with 
Britain‟s willingness and ability to finance them. As well as forming an implicit critique 
of past colonial inertia, ambitious proposals would raise local and international 
expectations and cause considerable embarrassment should Britain fail to meet them.
118
 
Preoccupied with the effect its assistance had on African hearts and minds, the Colonial 
Office aimed to keep the IBRD‟s estimates low, as any assistance already announced in 
World Bank reports might appear as the fulfillment of past commitments instead of 
genuine generosity. Britain‟s ability to negotiate aid based on political expediency and 
the adoption of acceptable policies would also be hampered if substantial funds were 
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already committed to World Bank programs.
119
 Limited planning capacity and a shortage 
of skilled personnel also inspired the Colonial Office caution, as well as the limited 
amount of debt servicing it considered feasible given East Africa‟s difficult budgetary 
situation.  
 
As with recurrent account assistance, the amount of finance Britain should provide for 
development purposes was not to be subjected to World Bank recommendations. The 
missions‟ terms of reference merely authorized them to make recommendations “in the 
light of resources likely to be available.”120 In their assessment of available finance, 
however, the missions were hampered by the Colonial Office‟s reluctance to provide 
information on ongoing negotiations with the East African governments on future 
development aid.
121
 As late as August 1962, for example, it was still pointed out to the 
Kenya mission that no firm assumptions about aid after independence could be made.
122
 
Partially, this silence reflected the open-endedness of negotiations, but it was also used 
by the Colonial Office as a means to limit expectations: rather than hinting at possible 
increases, the missions were told to assume a continuation of existing levels.
123
 As the 
missions had no interest in recommending programs which risked being abandoned 
because of capital shortages, the Colonial Office was able to limit their size. The same 
effect was obtained by drawing the missions‟ attention to developments whose adverse 
budgetary impact precluded a recurrent contribution to the development program.
124
 The 
fact that, as a result, development expenditure mostly needed to be financed through 
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loans was also capitalized on: under these circumstances only projects which generated 
sufficient revenue to service the debts incurred could be contemplated
125
.  
 
Each mission proposed an increase in development expenditure in comparison to 
previous years. Consistent with the Colonial Office‟s efforts, the proposed rise for 
Tanganyika and Uganda was modest. The Tanganyika program required £ 37 million 
over 6 years, involving an increase of annual development expenditure from £ 5 million 
to £ 6 million; Uganda‟s government program would cost £ 33.8 million over 5 years, 
raising annual expenditure from an average of £ 5.2 million to £ 6.8 million.
126
 This the 
Colonial Office considered feasible, even if the portion which remained to be financed 
was in both cases considerable.
127
 In the case of Kenya, however, the views of the 
Colonial Office and the IBRD mission diverged widely. At the root of the disagreement 
lay the financial implications of Britain‟s commitment to land settlement schemes.  
 
In many ways, the land settlement schemes were the glue holding Kenya‟s independence 
settlement together.
128
 What started as an attempt at creating a class of conservative 
African landowners, while simultaneously supporting European settlers by establishing a 
market in agricultural land, had by 1962 shifted towards a policy aimed at containing the 
threat Kikuyu landlessness and unemployment posed to an orderly political transition.
129
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The “Million Acre Scheme” introduced to this end provided for the purchase of land from 
departing settlers and its subdivision and sale to Africans receiving loans to cover the 
purchase and development costs.
130
 The cost of the scheme was estimated at £ 22 million, 
the majority of which was to be financed by Britain.
131
 Having taken on this heavy 
financial burden, Britain sought to reduce its other commitments: the IBRD mission was 
told that “this expenditure would compete for the same resources as the agricultural 
development program and it would appear inevitable that the latter program would have 
to be reduced, probably pro tanto.”132 The politically important settlement schemes would 
be a first charge on British development assistance to Kenya, and the capital Britain was 
prepared to provide for it would not be made available for any other purpose.
133
 By not 
taking these limitations into account, the Colonial Office feared, the World Bank team 
had already encouraged in Kenya higher hopes for assistance than justified.
134
 
 
The potential effect of land settlement on Kenya‟s development finance was dramatic: the 
Colonial Office argued that the mission‟s development program needed to be reduced by 
no less than £5 to £6 million per annum.
135
 The IBRD mission was not prepared to go this 
far. Mission members not only questioned the intrinsic merits of high density settlement, 
but also doubted whether a balanced development program was possible “or even 
whether Kenya could get by with a program in which there was this emphasis on 
settlement.”136 While Thompson in particular tried in vain to steer the Colonial Office 
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away from its endorsement of the Million Acre Scheme, the mission also reduced the size 
of its development program.
137
 The gap, however, was too wide to be bridged. In addition 
to land settlement, Galsworthy pointed out, the mission had not considered the cessation 
of CD&W grants supporting recurrent expenditure by £1.5 million a year: “It is a pity 
that we should in effect have to dissociate ourselves from the Bank Mission‟s proposals 
for total expenditure, but the reductions they have made in their program, although 
substantial, seem hardly enough and I very much doubt whether they will be prepared to 
go further.”138 Even if the unrealistic expectations of the Colonial Office were not 
fulfilled, the Kenya report was heavily influenced by its commitment to land settlement: 
the inclusion of £ 21 million for the settlement schemes raised the total cost to £ 56 
million, while expenditure on other projects had been reduced by £ 5.3 million.
139
 
 
All IBRD missions firmly vested their hopes for increasing revenue yielding economic 
activity on increased cash crop production using capital intensive farming methods. 
According to the missions‟ assessment, the injection of capital and increased productivity 
required a conversion from “traditional” farming methods “to farming as a business 
activity on efficiently run, planned farms of economic size.”140 Communal land 
ownership was identified as the root cause of low African productivity, leading each 
mission to advocate reform of the system of land tenure. Farmers‟ resistance to land 
reform and the initial expenses involved led the Tanganyika and Uganda missions in 
particular to approach the issue with caution, though this did not deflect them from the 
firm conviction that African governments, possessing the legitimacy which colonial 
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authorities lacked, could and should eventually carry this through.
141
 More immediate 
recommendations focused on „community development projects‟ and support for 
“progressive” farmers. Technical assistance and education for African co-operatives 
along with irrigation schemes and soil conservation programs were to increase the 
productivity and revenue contribution of peasant agriculture in the short term. Parallel to 
this, governments were advised that their limited resources were best used by “investing 
in success”: efforts and expenditure should be concentrated on economically successful 
farmers and the extension of large scale plantation agriculture.
142
  
 
The IBRD‟s proposals were of course familiar to the Colonial Office. The missions‟ 
approach was firmly in line with post-war colonial development doctrine and the 
recommendations of the East African Royal Commission in particular, while the Kenya 
report also enthusiastically endorsed the Swynnerton plan. Colonial attempts at 
transforming agricultural land use had faced African opposition, and the World Bank‟s 
proposals were likely to be similarly resisted.
143
 The transfer of resources from an 
economically disadvantaged majority to a wealthier minority implied in the support for 
capitalist farming from revenues from intensified peasant agriculture was fraught with 
political difficulties. The Uganda mission‟s proposal to use the Price Assistance Funds to 
finance the expansion of production rather than to support growers‟ incomes was 
unwelcome to Kiwanuka on similar grounds.
144
 In Kenya, the World Bank mission 
argued against high density settlement and unemployment relief measures to which the 
administration was already committed. The mission anticipated significantly lower 
productivity on high density holdings than could be achieved on larger farms, and feared 
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the implications for loan repayments and government revenue.
145
 The low density 
settlement schemes preferred by the IBRD, however, did not satisfy the political needs 
which inspired the Million Acre Scheme. Overall, the missions argued that East African 
governments could not afford to divert resources from the stimulation of production 
towards relief for landlessness, unemployment or falling incomes: the reliance on 
external borrowing for development purposes necessitated the generation of the resources 
by which loans could be serviced. With the exception of the Kenya settlement schemes 
the Colonial Office concurred; in this case too, however, high density settlement was 
considered a temporary sacrifice of sound economic policy to political expediency, rather 
than an alternative development strategy.
146
  
 
While the need to balance territorial budgets and limit financial claims on Britain 
received considerable attention, British intervention was most active on the issue of East 
Africa‟s currency arrangements. Initially, monetary reform was resisted on metropolitan 
grounds. In 1955 it was still noted that the Empire and Commonwealth held “something 
like a mortgage on our [Britain‟s, AR] reserves,” a situation which rendered any advice 
endangering the stability of the sterling balances highly unwelcome.
147
 Although the 
possibility of a “raid on the reserves” remained an issue of concern, it is not clear to what 
extent these fears continued to inform the attitude towards East Africa‟s monetary 
organization
148. What is clear, however, is that the Bank of England‟s opposition to IBRD 
interference in the currency field continued unabated. While the Bank‟s attitude was 
consistent with Krozewski‟s claim that its purpose was to guarantee the “smooth 
adjustment of policies on the periphery to British requirements,” such considerations 
were no longer openly admitted.
149
 Instead, the Bank‟s stated aim was the dissemination 
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of “sound” monetary practice throughout the sterling area. For the duration of this 
educational project, the devolution of political responsibility in the (ex-) colonies could 
not be matched by a similar move in the currency sphere.  
 
The Bank of England‟s preferred policy consisted of a gradual extension of the functions 
of the East African Currency Board (EACB) under the supervision of its own 
representative, John Loynes.
150
 Though the logical endpoint of this evolution was an East 
African central bank, the Bank of England‟s influence was aimed at delaying rather than 
speeding up its establishment. Cain and Hopkins‟ claim that the Bank of England actively 
encouraged the setting up of central banks in the colonies does not hold true for East 
Africa: while the Bank indeed sought to create the institutional framework best suited to 
check expansionist ambitions of African politicians, it feared that a prematurely 
established central bank would have the opposite effect.
151
 East African currency reform 
was defensive in nature, its main purpose being to hold off claims for more rapid or 
radical reform.
152
 Central banking was only reluctantly phased in as Bank of England 
officials realized its advent could not be avoided. 
 
The Bank of England‟s attitude towards advocates of central banking in East Africa was 
dismissive: central banks were merely of symbolic value to nationalist politicians, and 
calls for their establishment were often based on irrational premises and limited 
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understanding of their proper functioning.
153
 More particularly, the Bank was convinced 
that a central bank under African control would become a vehicle for imprudent 
inflationary policies as governments tried to meet escalating claims under conditions of 
great financial stringency.
154
 Though this fear was not entirely unfounded, the EACB‟s 
large currency cover arguably deprived East Africa of a legitimate source of development 
finance.
155
  The Bank of England, however, saw additional justification of its gradual 
approach in the shortage of educated personnel, and the desirability of the necessary 
experience being obtained within a modernized currency board rather than a fully 
managed central bank.
156
 More specific to East Africa was the argument that the 
successful operation of a central bank required close co-ordination of the territories‟ 
economic policies, which in turn depended on political integration. However, despite 
high British hopes, a federal East Africa was not yet in sight. Since it refused to consider 
central banks on a territorial basis, the Bank saw no alternative to maintaining the EACB 
as long as East Africa‟s political future remained uncertain.157  
 
The Bank of England‟s firm attitude, supported by the Colonial Office and the Treasury, 
succeeded in obtaining not only the exclusion of unwelcome recommendations, but also 
an endorsement of its policies. The greatest fear, in the case of the Tanganyika report, had 
been that the mission would recommend the establishment of a separate central bank, 
which would not only upset the territory‟s conservative currency arrangements, but 
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would also have far-reaching consequences for East African interregional relations.
158
 
The economic value of East African economic and political integration was the main 
argument used to dissuade the mission from examining Tanganyika‟s currency 
arrangements.
159
 Any discussion of currency arrangements, the Colonial Office made 
clear, should accept the continuation of the EACB as a given.
160
 Despite signs that 
Colonial Office pestering on currency issues caused friction with the IBRD mission, its 
recommendations were fully in accordance with British wishes: the report argued that the 
time was not yet ripe for setting up a central bank and recommended that Tanganyika 
should defer action until an East African central bank became practical politics.
161
  
 
The Uganda mission was also requested to exclude currency recommendations from its 
report. However, as a result of local criticism of Uganda‟s adherence to the EACB, the 
mission‟s tentative conclusions contained proposals to further reorganize the currency 
system.
162
 Although the EACB was commended for “eliminating the temptation to tinker 
with the currency,” the mission argued that Uganda would benefit from a properly 
managed central bank, and recommended that the evolution in this direction be speeded 
up.
163
 Several qualifications accompanied this proposal: the common East African 
currency and the link with sterling needed to be preserved, and the establishment of a 
central bank would remain a lengthy process.
164
 Even though Andrew Kamarck, the 
mission‟s chief economist, explained that his recommendations were designed to appease 
nationalist politicians while maintaining the substance of the Bank of England‟s 
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gradualist policy, the Bank was firmly opposed.
165
 Supported by the Treasury, it argued 
that until the political climate allowed the establishment of an East African central bank 
no further steps should be taken at all, and David Pitblado was instructed to obtain this 
modification.
166
 The subsequently revised currency recommendations still failed to 
satisfy: while the establishment of a central bank was made conditional upon political 
integration, the invitation of a central banking mission was not, and “somewhat 
unnecessary and inept recommendations about central banking” remained.167 British 
objections were again communicated to the IBRD and this time the desired result was 
achieved:
168
 central banking was still recommended as a future objective, but the report 
now warned that “the establishment of a sound central bank takes a long time and undue 
haste is not called for on any economic ground.”169 For the time being, Uganda should 
limit itself to supporting the continued evolution of the EACB.  
 
The Kenya mission proved more open to London‟s view that East Africa‟s joint currency 
system needed to be preserved intact.
170
 In its report, the mission fully endorsed the Bank 
of England‟s policies: “We suggest that the operations of the EACB should be developed 
step by step […] We see no immediate need for a central bank and consider that decisions 
on future political co-operation in East Africa should come first.”171 The draft report‟s 
only unwelcome recommendation had been that a financial advisor to the East African 
ministers of finance should be appointed. This function, the Bank of England maintained, 
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could most usefully be performed by the EACB‟s banking member, the Bank of 
England‟s own John Loynes.172 The mission readily obliged, and altered its 
recommendation to a call for the extension of the banking member‟s role.173 The Bank of 
England was now armed with three World Bank reports endorsing a cautious and 
conservative approach to monetary reform in East Africa which it could use to counter 
demands for faster progress or greater financial freedom.
174
 Monetary solutions to East 
Africa‟s financial difficulties were thus closed off, reinforcing the problems caused by 
low commodity prices and the limited availability of development finance.  
 
III. 
 
The post-war legitimization of Britain‟s colonial presence had linked political devolution 
to a program of economic and social development. In the second half of the 1950s, this 
policy was undermined by a capital shortage caused by a combination of the world 
commodity slump and Britain‟s own balance of payments difficulties. As Britain 
withdrew its commitment to colonial development, its relations with African elites 
became increasingly strained. While Britain tried to maintain friendly relations by 
speeding up political advancement, political devolution did not reduce calls for an 
extension of government services and British development assistance. The colonial 
budget deficits and Britain‟s reluctance to finance them presented colonial administrators 
with difficult policy dilemmas. Considered too conservative by African politicians and 
too liberal by the British Treasury, they appealed to the IBRD for support and advice.  
 
As East Africa‟s tight financial situation left little scope for new development initiatives, 
London was initially hesitant in endorsing the requests, as they wished to avoid the IBRD 
to recommend increased British financial assistance. Moreover the Bank of England and 
the Treasury were anxious to avoid any interference with the colonies‟ currency 
arrangements, as this could affect the sterling balances and thus threaten monetary 
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stability. Such reservations were overcome, however, by shifting the focus from 
developmental goals towards the aim of reconciling Britain‟s desire to limit its financial 
commitments to the colonies with maintaining friendly co-operation with African 
political elites. The assistance a World Bank general survey mission could provide in 
marrying both objectives ultimately secured London‟s support.  
 
While London‟s use of the IBRD missions was distinctly political, the World Bank was 
not a mere dummy to which Britain could dictate its own vision of the appropriate 
economic policies for its East African dependencies. British leverage over the IBRD 
missions was strictly limited, and direct pressure (in London or in Washington through 
Britain‟s executive director at the IBRD) was only applied where metropolitan interests 
were at stake – the management of sterling, the British balance of payments and the 
protection of its currency reserves. More widely, British hopes were confined to the 
maintenance of East African economic and political stability and the obtainment of local 
and international goodwill through the publication of reports supporting British 
orthodoxies against “inflated” local aspirations. While informal influence had been 
applied to secure conservative reports showing East African leaders the realities and 
policy implications of their territories‟ deteriorated financial situation, these discussions 
cannot be reduced to British attempts at exerting control. What was at stake in the 
arguments on East African economic development and monetary organization was the 
formulation, refinement and reproduction of what constituted knowledge on such 
subjects. In this sense, the East African IBRD missions were embedded in the history of a 
particular vision on economic development (export-led, capitalist, agricultural and open 
to global capital and commodity markets) which was rooted in colonial experience and 
embraced and disseminated by the World Bank.  
 
The IBRD reports largely conformed to British wishes. Much attention was paid to the 
need to balance government budgets by limiting government expenditure on non-
essential services and increasing taxable agricultural production. Austerity measures were 
advertised to African leaders by projecting large future benefits to be derived from 
temporary restraint. To the extent that such arguments were persuasive, the World Bank 
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reports helped to defuse the political tensions caused by Britain‟s financial 
disengagement from its East African colonies. In the currency field the IBRD missions 
did not challenge the temporary retention of British control. By providing an additional 
break on peripheral expansionism the continuation of the EACB deepened East Africa‟s 
shortage of development capital.  
 
As colonial economic prescriptions before them, the recommendations of the IBRD 
reports were not always practical politics. However, from Britain‟s perspective, their 
value depended not so much on their impact on East Africa as on their influence on the 
reputation British colonial rule enjoyed in East Africa, in the international arena, and at 
home. In this respect the reports were a triumph. No doubt Alan Peacock‟s description of 
the Tanganyika report as “an endorsement rather than a criticism of past policies of 
colonial government” was shared by many,175 while the “objective, disinterested, 
impartial record of what Great Britain has done in Kenya” led a reviewer of the Kenya 
report to muse: “If you read the whole book and then sit back and think what the country 
of Kenya was sixty or seventy years ago -warring tribes without even the wheel- it is 
some reward for the doubts and disappointments.”176 Though the empire might have 
ended, the reports seemed to imply, Britain could congratulate itself, and should be 
congratulated by others, on having adequately set East Africa on course for its 
autonomous economic development.  
 
While this study‟s conclusions are consistent with the recent historiography on 
decolonization in stressing the limits to both British power and ambitions, they also 
suggests that even its limited metropolitan concerns may have profoundly impacted the 
economic prescriptions put forward by the IBRD. The restrictions on East Africa‟s 
capital supply combined with the World Bank‟s pre-occupation with creditworthiness 
firmly focused the missions‟ attention on the territorial budget, resulting in 
recommendations to cut expenditure on services such as primary education and health 
care on the one hand, and continued reliance on the capitalist export sector for the 
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generation of tax revenues on the other.
177
 While the reaffirmation of colonial 
orthodoxies in the World Bank reports has to be accounted for as much by shared 
assumptions grounded in post-war development thought as by British pressure, this 
interaction between the retreating colonial power and the World Bank suggests that the 
way in which colonial economic, political and socio-cultural structures were transmitted 
deserves more attention than it has been granted in the recent literature on decolonization.  
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